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NOTES AND COMMENTS

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER UNDER STATE STATUTES*
Manslaughter, as defined at common law, consists of any unlawful killing of
a human being without malice, express or implied. It is the element of malice
which distinguishes manslaughter from murder, it being a constituent of the latter
offense. At common law, the offense of manslaughter is divided into two classes,
voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter is a homicidal act committed
with an intent to kill, but done under the influence of passion produced by some
provocation which the law, recognizing human frailty, considers sufficient to take
the act out of the murder category. Involuntary manslaughter is a homicide resulting from certain unlawful acts but without any intent to kill. Thus it is the
element of intent which is the determining factor in distinguishing between: voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
From the above discussion the importance which attaches to the term "provocation" in deterrmining whether an act is murder or voluntary manslaughter
can readily be seen. Four situations came to be recogmzed at common law as
providing adequate provocation to reduce a killing to the manslaughter level; these
being homicides resulting from sudden combat, assault and battery, discovery of
the wife in the act of adultery, or resistance to an illegal arrest.' The mere fact
that a homicide results from one of these four situations is not of itself sufficient
to make the act manslaughter instead of murder. Although there may have beeis
adequate provocation present, it is necessary to prove that such provocation
aroused a sufficient degree of passion. It must be shown that the provocation
and passion concur; violent passion alone or provocation alone, however adequate,
is insufficient. It is also necessary to negative the possibility that there was a cooling period following the provocation before the homicidal act was committed.
In determining whether there existed a sufficient degree of passion, the test is
objective. If the passion is of such a degree as would cause a reasonable man
to act on impulse and without reflection under similar circumstances, then the
act will not be murder.
Today every state, except Texas,- has a statute relating to the crime of manslaughter. These statutes represent a futile and chaotic attempt to codify the
offense. Rather than aiding the courts in their efforts to do justice when confronted with homicides, many of the present statutes merely blur the issue and
create confusion and bewilderment. The crime of manslaughter as it existed at
common law forms the basis for the offense under many of the statutes. Some
statutes have expanded the common law version; some have copied it; others
have contracted it; few have succeeded in presenting a workable and satisfactory
guide for the state courts. A look at the various statutes leaves the impression,
even to the casual observer, that seldom has so much effort produced such meager
results.
L Statutes which neither define nor classify manslaughter.
The common law definition of manslaughter is generally applied under statutes which merely provide punishment for the offense or which define it sub* This is a companion note to the one by Mr. Stephens on p. 108.
'MAY s CRImN.L LAW, see. 226 (Third ed. 1921); Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 295 (1850); State v. Murphy, 61 Me. 56 (1870); Preston
v. State, 25 Miss. 883 (1853); Holly v. State, 10 Humph. (Tenn.) 141 (1849);
Maria v. State, 28 Tex. 698 (1866).
"Manslaughter abolished in Tex. by act of 1927, 46th Leg., p. 412, as cited
in 25 Cal. L. R. 3 (1936).
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stantially according to the common law. Just how much the courts must of
necessity rely upon the common law definition may be evidenced from the number
of states which fall within such a group. Twelve states3 do not define the crime
by statute. The Kentucky manslaughter statute is typical of the importance which
these state legislatures attach to the formulation of an enlightened definition. The
statute states that:
"Any person who commits voluntary manslaughter shall
be confined in the penitentiary for not less than two nor more than
twenty-one years."
Such a statute is little better than no statute. It merely marks a start and a
finish line but leaves the court without anything to set the pace. Not only does
such a statute fail to outline the elements necessary to constitute the crime in
general, but it also fails to separate the offense into any classification. This factor
places a double burden upon the court. Not only must that legal body determine
whether a homicide is manslaughter, but it must rather blindly attempt to arrive
at a just punitive measure. In effect the result is the same as if there were no
statute, since the common law furnishes the mechanics with which a judicial
decision is reached. How successful a court will be in such a situation depends
upon the facility with which that body can interpret the common law and apply
such interpretation to the facts of the case. Such circumstances leave the twelve
states having such a statute with a vast area forimprovement. Perhaps necessity
will eventually change such an undesirable codification of the law.
-.-II. Statutes which classify! but do not define.
The legislatures of four states' went a step further than did the ones in the
previous group, and in drawing up a statute, they distinguished between voluntary
and involuntary manslaughter, adhering for the most part to the common law
Zlassification. Most of these statutes specify the rmnmum and maximum punishment for each class, the sentence being greater for voluntary than involuntary
manslaughter. In reality, such a classification is of little ad to the courts in carrying out their judicial function. These statutes bieak down a general term into
two categories, but fail to stipulate the fundamental elements necessary to deter'CONN. GEN. STAT. 6046 (1930); DEL. REV. CODE 5161 (1935); IowA CODE
690.10 (1946); Ky. R. S. 435.020 (1948); LA. CODE OF Caim. LAW AND PROC.
740-31 (Dart, 1943); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, see. 436 (Flack, 1939); MAss.
GEN. LAws c. 265, sec. 13 (1932); MiCH. Comp. LAws sec. 16717 (1929); N. J.
R. S. 2:138-5 (1937); N. C. GEN. STAT. see. 14-18 (1943); R. I. GEN. LAws
c. 606, sec. 3 (1938); VT. PuB. LAWs c. 335 see. 8377 (1933). Note that all
these statutes are worded practically the same as the Kentucky Statute cited, the
only variations being in form. The Louisiana Statute is the only one that defines
the crime to any extent, stating "manslaughter is a homicide which would be
murder under subdivision (1) of art. 30 (murder), but the offense is committed
in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient
to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection."
'PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, sec. 2225 (Purdon, 1936); S. C. CODE OF LAWS
vol. 1, see. 1107 (1942); VA. CODE ANN. tit. 40, c. 178, sec. 4396 (1942); W VA.
CODE ANN. c. 61, art. 2, sec. 5919 (1943); Note that Penna. and Virginia have
statutes sunilar to that of West Virginia which is cited. The South Carolina
Statute states "Manslaughter, or the unlawful killing of another without malice,
express or implied, shall be punishable
"providd, that in case where the
jury returns a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter the punishment shall
not be less than three months
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mine within which category any given state of facts falls. The West Virginia
statute is typical. It provides:
"Voluntary manslaughter shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years.
"Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor, and any
person convicted thereof shall be confined in jail not to exceed one
year, or fined not to exceed one thousand dollars, or both, in the
discretion of the court."
Such a statute would be meaningless should there be no common law upon which
the courts could rely to fill in the missing links comprising the homicidal act of
manslaughter. Most of the statutes under consideration, in defining voluntary
manslaughter, employ the words "voluntary or voluntarily." This fact emphasizes
the haphazard effort which has been made to place at the court's disposal a satisfactory and workable statute. Perhaps these states will someday give substance
to their meager statutes.

M.

Statutes which define and classify.
Twelve states5 have statutes which define manslaughter generally as "the unlawful killing of a human being without malice." These statutes go further and
divide the offense into two classes, voluntary and involuntary, with an accompanying definition for each. Wyoming s statute is a good example. It provides:
"Whoever unlawfully kills any human being without
malice, expressed or implied, either voluntarily, upon a sudden heat
of passion, or involuntarily, but in the commission of some unlawful
act, or by any culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, is guilty of
manslaughter, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary not more
than twenty (20) years."
'Aruz. CODE ANN. 43-2904 (1939); Aax. STAT. ANN. 41-2208 (1947)r:-CAL.
PENAL CODE sec. 192 (1941); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, sec. 34 (1935); GA. ANN.
CODE., vol. 6, sec. 65 (Parks, 1914); IDAHO CODE ANN., 17-1106 (1932); IND.
STAT. ANN., 10-3405 (Burns, 1933); MONT. REV. CODE ANN., 10959 (1935);
N. M. STAT. ANN. 41-2407 (1941); TENN. CODE ANN., vol. 7, sec. 10774 (Williams, 1934); UTAH CODE AN., Vol 5, tit. 103, c. 28, sec. 5 (1943); Wyo. CoMa,.
STAT., 9-205 (1945). Note that Ariz., Cal., Idaho, Mont., N. M., and Tenn. have
statutes similar to that of Utah which states "Manslaughter is the unlawful killing
of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds: (1) Voluntary, upon a
sudden quarrel or in a heat of passion
"
Indiana has a statute substantially
similar to the Wyoming Statute cited in the text. The Arkansas Statute states
"Manslaughter must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a
provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible." Colorado s
Statute reads "In cases of voluntary manslaughter there must be a serious and
highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an
irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an attempt by the person killed to
commit a serious personal injury on the person killing." The Georgia Statute-,savs
that "In all cases of voluntary manslaughter, there must be some actual assault
upon the person killing, or an attempt by the person killed to commit a .serious
personal injury on the person killing, or other eqmvalent circumstance t" justify
the excitement of passion, and to exclude all idea of deliberation or ni~liciieiffr
express or implied. Provocation by words, threats, menaces, or other contemptuous
gestures shall in no case be sufficient to free the person killing from the guilt'and
crime of murder. The killing must be from the result of that sudden, violent
impulse of passion supposed to be irresistible; for if there should have been an
interval between the assault or provocation given and the homicide, of.wluch the
jury in all cases shall be the judges, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity
to be heard, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge,. and be punighed
.
"
as murder."
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Such a statute resembles the common law definition of manslaughter but fails
to point up the offense adequately, leaving it to the court to mampulate a rather
broad statement of the offense. Merely stating that the crime must be committed
upon a sudden heat of passion does not substantially guide the court in arriving
at a favorable decision. The court must decide in what instances sufficient passion
is aroused and must determine whether the test is to be objective or subjective.
Interpreting such a statute literally, sudden passion may result from any provocation. Since these statutes are so similar to the common law version of the crime,
the courts may adhere to the latter rules in applying the statutes, or they may
interpret them in much broader terms than is possible by operating on common
law principles. It can readily be seen that such a situation will produce a great
number of interpretations and that confusion is inevitable. With little effort
such a statute may be clarified and made into a potential court weapon rather
than a mediocre and inadequate codification.
IV Statutes which define and classifj in terms of degrees.
Eight states' have statutes which divide manslaughter into degrees by adoptinging the common law concepts as a basis and then adding several legislative
principles. Apparently this combination represents an effort to make these statutes
as definite as possible and at the same time modermze the common law version
by supplementing the latter wherever it is deemed necessary. Voluntary manslaughter in such statutes is designated as first degree manslaughter and is defined
in elaborate terms, with the inclusion in addition of such specific behavior as
killing an unborn quick child, assisting in self-murder and committing manslaughter while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor. The Minnesota
statute is representative of the type under consideration. It states:
"Such homicide is manslaughter in the first degree when
committed without a design to effect death: (1) By a person engaged
in committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor affecting the
person or property, either of the person killed or of another; (2) In
the heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means
of a dangerous weapon; or (3) By shooting another with a gun or
other fire arm when resulting from carelessness in rmstaking the person shot for a deer or other animal."
In substance, the rest of the statute says that:
The killing of an unborn quick child or mother wilfully
is manslaughter in the first degree unless done to preserve the life
of the mother.
There can be no doubt that these statutes represent much effort to produce a codification which will be a valuable aid to the court. However, since the statutes
represent a combination of common law and legislative principles, it is difficult to
'CODE OF ALA. tit. 14, sec. 320 (1940); tK&N. REv. STAT. 21-407
et seq. (Corrick, 1935); MINN. STAT. 619.15 et seq. (1945); N. H. REv. STAT.
c. 455, secs. 8-9 (1942); N. D. REv. CODE, 12-2717 et seq. (1943); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 21, sec. 711 at seq. (1941); S. D. CODE 13.2018 et seq. (1939); Wis. STAT.
340.10 et seq. (1943). Note that the statutes of Kan., N. H., N. D., Okla., S. D.,
and Wis. closely resemble the Minnesota Statute cited in the text. The Alabama
Statute states "Manslaughter, by voluntarily depriving a human being of life is
pianslaughter in the first degree,"
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determine whether the legislatures intended that the courts adhere to the statutes
strictly as stated or that they rely upon the common law at their discretion.
V

Miscellaneous

The remainder of the states have statutes which cannot be included i any
broad classification, although most of them are substantially similar to at least one
of the groups set out above. Illinois, Nevada, and Oregon' have statutes which
are worded alike, those of Illinois and Nevada being identical, stating:
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice, ex-press or implied, and without any mxture of
deliberation whatever. It must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of
passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the
"
passion irresistible;
These statutes resemble those discussed in the third group except that they require
that the act be done without deliberation as well as without malice. They are
very similar to the common law definition but leave it for the courts to decide
what will constitute adequate provocation to arouse irresistible passion. The
Oregon statute makes no distinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
Florida, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, and Washington! have statutes wl.uih
define voluntary manslaughter in a negative manner. The Florida Statute sta-es:
"The killing of a human being by the act, procurement
or culpable negligence of another, in cases where such killing shall
not be ]ustifiable or excusable homicide nor murder
shall be
"
deemed manslaughter and shall be punished
Such a statute merely points out what homicides are not manslaughter but fails
to include any of the elements which distinguish manslaughter from murder or
justifiable homicide. In effect, it accomplishes little more than do the statutes in
the first group. The Mississippi, Missouri, and Washington Statutes cite certain
acts falling within the statute (e.g., killing an unborn quick child or assisting in
self-murder) as do the statutes in the fourth group. The Mississippi statute does
not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter.
The New York Statute9 separates manslaughter from the common law definition to a greater extent than does that of any other state. It is a highly techmcal
and complicated piece of legislation which divides the offense into degrees, voluntary manslaughter constituting the first degree. Under this statute, homicide
"in the heat of passion" is first degree manslaughter if committed "in a cruel and
unusual manner or by means of a dangerous weapon." A killing is also first degree
" tL. REv. STAT. c. 38, sec. 361 (1947); NEv. COMP. LAws, 10069 (Hillyer,
1929); ORE. Com. LAws ANN. 23-405 (1940). Note that the Oregon Statute
reads "If any person shall, without malice, express or implied, and without deliberation, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently
suficient to make the passion irresistible, voluntarily kill another, such person
shall 8be deemed guilty of manslaughter."
FLA. STAT. sec. 782.07 (1941); Mo. REv. STAT. 4382 et seq. (1939); Miss.
CODE ANN. Vol. 2, 2220 et seq. (1942); Omo CODE 12404 (Page, 1939); WAsH.
REv. STAT. ANN. 2395 et seq. (Remington, 1932).
'Thompson s Laws of N. Y., 1049-1052 (1939); N. Y. CraM. CODE sees. 10491052 (Thompson, 1989).
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manslaughter if done "by a person engaged in committing or attempting to commit
a misdemeanor affecting the person or property of another or of the person killed."
The Maine and Nebraska Statutes10 define but do not classify the offense.
The cnme of manslaughter was abolished in Texas in 1927. Texas, however, has
the statutory offense known as homicide by negligence which corresponds approximately to the crime of involuntary manslaughter."
With such marked variations in the present state statutes, it is evident that
statutory manslaughter is indeed a fertile field for research, interpretation, and
application. However, little has been done to improve this unsatisfactory situation.
When an attempt is made to formulate a model statute, the problems confronted
explain the existence of the many statutory variations. Numerous issues arise
which must be answered before a satisfactory statute can be constructed. Is the
common law definition applicable todayP In what ways can such definition be
made more complete? Should the test be objective or subjective? What constitutes adequate provocation? These are only a few of the problems which must be
dealt with. Failure to handle such issues successfully accounts for the large
number of unwieldy statutes.
Since common law manslaughter still exerts strong influence today, it seems
that the best approach to the creation of a statute is to use the common law principles as a basis and then proceed to expand, elaborate and clarify these principles.
As a foundation there would have to be an unlawful killing of a person without
either express or implied malice. It is at this point that the different states have
departed from any semblance of uniformity. Consequently, this is the place to
separate the chaff and add the necessary elements, the ultimate success of the
statute depending on how well such contraction and expansion is effected.
While the absence of malice is essential to manslaughter; in contrast, the
presence of passion for this crime is a necessity. In determiing the adequacy
of passion, it is apparent that the test must, for practical purposes, be objective.
To make the test subjective would add to the many problems rather than decrease
them. It would place an undue burden on the court in its efforts to protect the
innocent, pumsh the guilty and prevent a failure of justice. Closely related to
the element of passion is that of provocation. These two terms are not synonomous nor are they interchangeable. Both are indispensable and provocation must
precede passion, the latter flowing directly from the former. As to what constitutes adequate provocation, the statutes are in discord. Some states rely solely
on the common law provocations; others have adopted those four and have added
to them; still others have failed to clearly specify just what will constitute adequate
provocation.
The solution is not an easy one. Uniformity of statutes and their facility
of interpretation and application are of prime importance. Therefore it appears
that the common law provocations are sufficient with perhaps the addition of one
other, that being oral provocation, i.e.,,words alone. As yet this-last one has
had little acceptance but possibly the trend is in that direction. Logically, oral
provocation, as compared with the others, would rest upon solid ground.
The lapse of time between the passion and the homicidal act must preclude
'*ME. REV. STAT. c. 129, see. 2 (1930); NEB. REv. STAT. sec. 28-403 (1943);
Note that both statutes are similar to the Wyoming Statute cited in the text
lRiesenfeld, Negligent Homicide, 25 Cal. 1, p. 3, fn. 5, A Study In Statutory
Interpretation.
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the possibility of a subsidence of the passion. Here again the standard must be
objective. To make it subjective would substantially increase the obstacles encountered by the court in its effort to apply the statute and arrive at a satisfactory

decision.
Once the essentials have been formulated, the final task is to assemble them
into a concise, yet flexible, statute. Care must be taken lest the legislative intent
become lost in a morass of words. The success achieved in coordinating the parts
into a coherent pattern will directly affect the ease with which it may be mampulated by the court and will indirectly influence the ultimate decision. The following statute, which incorporates the findings in this study as to voluntary
manslaughter, is offered as a solution to the problem:
"Voluntary manslaughter is an unlawful homicidal act
committed without malice, in sudden passion immediately caused by
provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control
and cool reflection."
CnARuLs GROMLEY

